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Case No. 20061051-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Darren Raymond Coco, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for obstructing justice, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Where the instructions and the general verdict form did not require the jury 
to determine whether defendant concealed evidence of a misdemeanor or felony, 
was the trial court required to treat defendant's conviction for obstructing justice as 
a class A misdemeanor rather than a third degree felony (enhanced one degree 
pursuant to the "in concert" enhancement)?1 
1
 Defendant does not challenge the "in concert" enhancement on appeal. 
Standard of Review. The "invited error" doctrine precludes an appellate 
challenge to jury instructions that defendant approved at trial below. State v. 
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 26,153 P.3d 804. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice—Elements—Penalties—Exceptions 
(1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of any person regarding conduct that 
constitutes a criminal offense: 
* * * 
(c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
* * * 
(2)(a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal 
offense" means conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is 
separate from a violation of this section .. . 
* * * 
(3) The penalties for obstruction of justice are: 
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an 
offense would be a capital felony or first degree felony; 
(b) a third degree felony if: 
(i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second 
or third degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (l)(b), (c), 
(d), (e), or (f); 
(ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any 
offense other than a capital or first degree felony and the actor 
violates Subsection (l)(a); or 
(iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed 
before a court of law; or 
(c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not 
enumerated under Subsection (3) (a) or (b). 
(4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of 
penalty for the conduct constituting an offense. 
* * * 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below. 
Defendant was charged with (1) aggravated assault of Jerry Graham, and 
(2) obstruction of justice. R. 13-15. The charging information also gave notice that 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (West 2004), the obstruction of justice 
charge was subject to an enhanced penalty upon a finding that defendant acted in 
concert with two or more persons. R. 14. Following a two-day trial, a jury found 
defendant not guilty of aggravated assault but guilty of obstructing justice. R. 129-
32, 176-77. The jury also returned a special verdict finding that defendant 
committed the offense of obstructing justice "in concert with two or more persons." 
R. 178. Prior to sentencing, defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, asking that 
the court treat his conviction as a class A misdemeanor (subject, of course, to the "in 
concert" enhancement). R. 190-200. The court denied the motion, treated his 
conviction as a third degree felony, enhanced it to a second degree felony under the 
"in concert" enhancement, and sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison 
term of one-to-fifteen years. R. 217-18; R. 251:34-35,38. Defendant timely appealed. 
R. 227-28. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
The Confrontation and Beating 
On the evening of November 18, 2005, defendant was at home in his fourth 
floor apartment with his friends, Keith DeGruy and Phyllis Scott. R. 252:63-64,149, 
172; R. 253: 235,250-51. Sometime between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m., they received a visit 
from Donald Joseph, Joseph's girlfriend Cocoa Marquez, and Joseph's backup Jerry 
Graham. R. 252: 53-54, 59, 61-63, 101, 172; R. 253: 211-12, 215, 231-32, 234, 251. 
Graham joined DeGruy and Scott in the dining room, picked up a pocket knife lying 
on the dining room table, opened it, and began playing with it. R. 252: 66,68,105-
06; R. 253: 253-54. Meanwhile, Joseph and Marquez confronted defendant near his 
bedroom door and accused him of raping Marquez. R. 252: 63-65,172; R. 253: 234, 
241, 252. Defendant denied that he raped Marquez. R. 252: 65; R. 253: 241,252; but 
see R. 252:101-02. After Marquez insisted that he had, Joseph punched defendant in 
the face, causing his knees to buckle under him. R. 252: 65,102-03,105. Joseph then 
pulled out a metal wrench and began beating defendant over the head with it. R. 
252:172-73; R. 253: 234, 244, 246-47, 252-53. 
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Graham also joined in the beating of defendant. R. 252:173; R. 253: 238-39, 
241,254-55.2 When Graham saw DeGruy get up from the table to help defendant, he 
warned DeGruy to mind his own business. R. 252: 65, 68-69; R. 253: 254. As 
defendant attempted to defend himself from the two men, the fight spilled over into 
the kitchen. R. 252:173,234; R. 253:258-60. As the fight continued, Cocoa Marquez 
and Phyllis Scott exited the apartment. R. 253: 234, 239, 244. Defendant was 
bloodied, appeared to have a broken nose, and was in "bad shape/7 but the beating 
continued. R. 252: 65-66, 70-73, 771 88-89. 
The Stabbings 
At some point, defendant pulled out a knife from a kitchen drawer and fatally 
stabbed Joseph, who then fell behind a doorway. R. 252:173-75; R. 253:261,266. He 
also stabbed Graham in the stomach. R. 252: 81-82,111-12,173-75; R. 253: 261-62. 
Graham, while holding his stomach to keep his intestines from spilling out, fled the 
apartment complex with Marquez, leaving Joseph behind. R. 252: 84-85,113,173; 
R. 253: 212,234-35, 241-43, 262,266-67. Marquez dialed 9-1-1 and the two walked 
down the street away from the complex until police and emergency personnel 
2
 Graham denied that he joined in the beating of defendant. R. 252:105. In 
fact, he claimed that he convinced Joseph to stop the beating and leave the 
apartment because he feared Joseph was "going to really hurt the guy" and "kill 
him." R. 252: 73-74, 78,109-10. Graham's account was necessarily rejected by the 
jury because they acquitted defendant of aggravated assault. 
6 
arrived. R. 253:211-12,235. Before Graham was transported to the hospital, police 
recovered from one of his pants pockets the pocket knife he had taken from 
defendant's dining room table. R. 252:186-87. 
9c "k •k 
The parties' account of precisely how the stabbings unfolded varied. 
Defendant did not testify. However, when interviewed by police, he said that he 
stabbed Graham while Graham was fleeing the apartment. R. 252:173. He claimed 
that as they were leaving the apartment, defendant got up from the floor, retrieved a 
knife from a kitchen drawer, and assaulted them with the knife. R. 252: 78-79. He 
testified that he was stabbed by defendant first. R. 252: 79-82, 111. He testified that 
defendant then rushed towards Joseph, who was attempting to flee towards the 
back of the home. R. 252: 84, 90, 113. In contrast, DeGruy testified that while 
defendant was being beaten by Graham and Joseph in the kitchen, defendant 
reached into the kitchen drawer, pulled out the knife, and stabbed his assailants in 
self-defense. See R. 253: 260-62, 266. Because the jury acquitted defendant of 
aggravated assault on Graham, this Court must assume that the jury accepted 
DeGruy's account that defendant stabbed Graham in self-defense. See State v. 
Gordon, 913 P.2d 350,351 (Utah 1996) (holding that" [o]n appeal from a jury verdict, 
[the appellate court] view[s] the evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to that verdict"). 
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Obstructing Justice 
After Graham and Marquez fled, defendant, DeGruy, and Scott decided to 
clean up the apartment rather than call police. R. 252:179-80; R. 253: 270. Using 
rags, Comet, and PineSol, the three tried to wipe up the blood that had been 
spattered about from the beating and stabbings. R. 252:176-77; see also R. 253: 263-
64. Defendant washed the knife he used to stab Joseph and Graham. R. 252:176. 
He washed the wall. R. 252:176-77. He also tried to clean the large blood stain on 
the living room carpet and moved the couch over the stain. R. 252:176. While they 
were cleaning up the apartment, the apartment manager knocked on defendant's 
door. R. 252: 175; R. 253: 206-07. Before opening the door to speak with the 
manager, defendant dragged Joseph's body into the living room behind a half wall 
that obstructed the body's view from the door. R. 252:175-76; R. accord 253: 271. 
After the manager left, the three finished cleaning up the apartment. See R. 
253: 271. They filled two trash bags with rags and other soiled items. R. 252:180; R. 
253: 263-64. DeGruy took Joseph's pants and shoes and threw them into one of the 
trash bags. R. 253: 263-64,268,271. He then threw Joseph's body over the balcony 
to the ground below. R. 253: 263,269. DeGruy deposited one of the trash bags into 
a dumpster at the apartment complex and the other into a dumpster outside a 
nearby JiffyLube. R. 252:141,160-61; R. 253: 264, 271. Knowing that police were 
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likely on their way, defendant, Graham, and Scott left in a taxi cab and stayed at a 
Motel 6. R. 253: 272. 
The Police Investigation 
Later that evening, when police discovered Joseph's body on the ground 
directly below defendant's apartment, found evidence that it had been dropped 
from above, and learned from neighbors that a fight had occurred earlier that 
evening at defendant's apartment, they secured a warrant to search defendant's 
apartment. R. 252: 125,128-31,139-40. Upon entering the apartment, homicide 
detective Kelly Kent immediately detected a the "very obvious" and strong "smell 
of cleaners; Comet, PineSol, bleach, that kind of thing." R. 252:133,147,170. Officer 
Kent also saw on the door knobs and counters the "white, hazy film" that Comet 
leaves when it is not wiped clean with a fresh, wet rag. R. 252:131-32,147. In the 
pantry, he found a bottle of PineSol, a can of Comet, a box of black GLAD trash bags 
with "scalloped" tie tops, and a mop. R. 252:133-34,145; SE21. The mop was still 
wet and smelled of PineSol. R. 252:134. 
Officer Kent also saw blood spatter throughout the apartment—on the 
counter, walls, doors, and carpet. R. 252:133,138-39,146-48,159-60; accord 170-71. 
He also found evidence that the couch in the living room had recently been moved, 
and after officers moved it aside, he saw a large blood stain on the carpet. R. 252: 
135-37,171. He found a large kitchen knife in the dishwasher that appeared to have 
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some remaining blood where the blade meets the handle. R. 252:144-45; SE18-20. 
Officers also found blood, which appeared to have been partially wiped clean, on 
the balcony of the apartment. R. 252:138. They also found blood drops on the third 
floor balcony directly below defendant's apartment. R. 252:139. 
Police recovered rags smelling of PineSol in a black trash bag, identical to 
GLAD bags found in the pantry, in a dumpster in the utility room of the apartment 
complex. R. 252:134-38,140,145; SE5-6. Several days later, police found a black 
trash bag, again identical to the GLAD bags in defendant's pantry, in a dumpster 
outside of a Jiffy Lube that was a block and a half west of the apartment complex. R. 
252:141-42,145,160-61. Upon opening the bag, it smelled of PineSol and contained 
bloody rags, blankets, shoes, and a pair of pants. R. 252:142-43; SE15-17. 
After five days of searching for defendant, police finally tracked him down to 
a friend's apartment. R. 252:148-51,154,161-62. Defendant had multiple injuries to 
his head, face, hands, arms, and torso. R. 252:151,185-86; DE25,30-31,38-40. When 
asked about the injuries, defendant told officers that a couple of days ago some 
people had visited him at his apartment, accused him of rape, and attacked him— 
one of them with a wrench. R. 252:151-52. Officers never found the wrench. R. 252: 
181. Although DeGruy claimed that defendant did not help in the clean-up, he 
denied disposing of the wrench himself. R. 253: 265, 270. When defendant was 
asked about the wrench following his apprehension, he told police to talk to 
10 
DeGruy. R. 252:181. His injuries, however, were consistent with his claim that he 
was beaten with a wrench. See R. 252:155-56. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Under section 76-8-306, a conviction for obstructing justice is (1) a second 
degree felony if the defendant obstructs the investigation of a capital felony or a first 
degree felony, (2) a third degree felony if the defendant obstructs the investigation 
of a second or third degree felony, and (3) a class A misdemeanor if the defendant 
obstructs the investigation of a misdemeanor. Defendant argues that because the 
jury was not instructed on these differences and the court cannot determine from 
the general verdict on what basis the jury found obstruction, his conviction should 
be entered as a class A misdemeanor, enhanced to a third degree felony under the 
"in concert" enhancement. (Defendant does not challenge the "in concert" 
enhancement). Defendant, however, approved the jury instructions. Accordingly, 
his claim may not be heard on appeal under the invited error doctrine. 
Defendant's claim would fail in any event. A review of the record 
demonstrates that the jury only considered underlying criminal conduct that 
constituted a felony. Accordingly, the trial court properly entered defendant's 
conviction for obstruction of justice as a third degree felony, enhanced to a second 
degree felony under the "in concert" enhancement. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED DEFENDANTS 
CONVICTION FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AS A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, ENHANCED TO A SECOND DEGREE FELONY 
UNDER THE "IN CONCERT" ENHANCEMENT 
Under section 76-8-306, a person is guilty of obstructing justice if he or she 
"alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing" with the "intent to 
hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, 
or punishment of any person regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(1)(c) (West 2004). A conviction under subsection (l)(c) 
may be entered as a second degree felony, a third degree felony, or a class A 
misdemeanor, depending on the nature of the crime sought to be concealed. A 
person is guilty of: 
(a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitute[d] an 
offense would be a capital felony or first degree felony; 
(b) a third degree felony if . . . the conduct that constitute [d] an 
offense would be a second or third degree felony . . . ; or 
(c) a class A misdemeanor for any [other] violation . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306(3) (West 2004). 
Following the jury verdict finding defendant guilty of obstructing justice, 
defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment, requesting that the district court treat 
his conviction as a class A misdemeanor under subsection 3(c), rather than as a third 
degree felony under subsection 3(b). R. 190-200. Defendant did not challenge the 
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jury's finding that he acted in concert with two or more persons. Accordingly, he 
requested that his conviction be entered as a third degree felony, rather than a 
second felony, under the "in concert" enhancement. R. 190-200. The State opposed 
defendant's motion, arguing that defendant's conviction should be treated as a third 
degree felony (enhanced to a second degree felony under the "in concert" 
enhancement). The district court denied defendant's motion and entered 
defendant's conviction as a second degree felony. 
A. This Court should not address defendants claim because he invited 
any error. 
On appeal, defendant complains that "[i]t is impossible to determine from the 
jury's verdict what criminal conduct they found" he attempted to conceal. Aplt. Brf. 
at 20. Similarly, he complains that "the jury was not instructed on what underlying 
criminal conduct would make the offense a third degree felony [under subsection 
3(b)], and or a class A misdemeanor [under subsection 3(c)]. Aplt. Brf. at 21. 
Defendant thus argues that "he is entitled to the lesser degree punishment" because 
it cannot be determined, "by the manner in which the jury was instructed, or by the 
jury verdict," whether the jury relied on misdemeanor or felony conduct. Aplt. Brf. 
at 22. 
Defendant has not argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a jury 
finding that he attempted to conceal evidence of a felony or a misdemeanor. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 18-22. He simply claims that because the jury was not sufficiently 
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instructed on the variations of the obstruction charge and was given only a general 
verdict form, he is entitled to be sentenced to the lesser degree of punishment. His 
claim fails because he invited any error. 
A review of the record reveals that except for perhaps one exception, the 
parties stipulated to the instructions given to the jury. Before trial began, defense 
counsel indicated that "[t]here maybe [sic] some outstanding matters in terms of 
jury instructions/' but that "maybe [they] could work them out." R. 252:1. The trial 
court replied, "Sure. If you're able to submit to me a stipulated set, that's great." R. 
252:1. 
The instructions were not mentioned thereafter until after the close of the 
State's case-in-chief and the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. Although defense counsel did not have the proposed instructions before 
him, the court invited him to state his exception to proposed Instruction No. 29, 
which apparently explained the meaning of "conduct that constitutes a criminal 
offense" and identified homicide as one such criminal offense. R. 253:248. Counsel 
for defendant stated that he objected to the instruction's inclusion of homicide as 
one of the underlying offenses, complaining that it would make the obstruction of 
justice charge "a higher level of offense," R. 253: 248, i.e., it would be a second 
degree felony under subsection 3(a). He also complained that the instruction was 
"confusing to the jury." R. 253: 248. The prosecutor countered, explaining that the 
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instruction was an accurate statement of the law and that inclusion of homicide was 
necessary for the jury to understand that "there is an underlying reason for the 
obstruction/7 R. 253: 249. The trial court then noted that it had in fact "ma[d]e 
certain modifications to that instruction request, at [defense counseFs] request/7 
The court further explained that "the concept needed to be defined and furthermore, 
that the definition cited in Instruction No. 29 is in compliance with the statutory 
provision/7 R. 253: 249. 
The instructions were not again mentioned in the record until just prior to 
their reading. In introducing the instructions, the trial court stated that it would 
"now give [the jury] the instructions on the law, which counsel and I have been 
working on in our incessant delays/7 R. 253: 274-75. It is apparent from the court's 
comment, and the lack of any other objection, that the parties worked out any 
differences they had on the instructions and stipulated to the instructions as given. 
The only complaint registered by defendant to the instructions was to the 
identification of homicide as an underlying offense for obstruction, and he made no 
objection to it afterwards. Nor has defendant challenged it on appeal. 
Defendant did not ask that instructions be given advising the jury that they 
should determine whether defendant concealed evidence of a misdemeanor offense 
or a felony offense. Defendant did not request a special verdict form, but 
apparently agreed to the issuance of the general jury verdict form. "Because trial 
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counsel confirmed the jury instructions without objection, invited error prevents 
[this Court's] review" on appeal. State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, Tf 26,153 P.3d 
804. "Defendant cannot lead the court into error by failing to object and then later, 
when he is displeased with the verdict, profit by his actions." State v. Anderson, 929 
P.2d 1107,1109 (Utah 1996) (quotations and citations omitted).3 
B. A review of the record reveals that the jury's verdict of guilt could 
not, in any event, have been based on a finding that defendant 
concealed evidence of a misdemeanor offense. 
In any event, a review of the record demonstrates that the jury could not have 
concluded that defendant obstructed the investigation of a misdemeanor offense. 
Defendant argues that the jury could have found he obstructed the investigation of a 
number of crimes, including misdemeanor offenses. Aplt. Brf. at 19. He argues that 
because the court cannot determine whether the jury relied on a misdemeanor or 
felony offense, principles of equal protection and due process require a finding that 
the jury relied on the lesser misdemeanor offense. Aplt. Brf. at 22. As such, 
defendant reasons, the obstruction of justice conviction would be a class A 
misdemeanor under section 76-8-306(3) (c) (enhanced to a third degree felony 
pursuant to the "in concert" enhancement). Aplt. Brf. at 22. 
3
 Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant did not affirmatively approve the 
jury instructions and general verdict form, but simply failed to raise an objection, 
review of his claim under plain error is precluded because he has not argued plain 
error. 
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Defendant's claim fails on the merits because it rests on a faulty premise—that 
the jury might have found that he obstructed the investigation of a misdemeanor, 
rather than a felony. See Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. A review of the instructions and the 
prosecutor's closing arguments reveals that the jury could not have based its verdict 
on conduct that constituted a misdemeanor offense because no such offense was 
identified in the instructions or otherwise argued by the prosecutor. 
The instructions to the jury specified only a limited number of offenses upon 
which the jury could rely in deciding whether defendant obstructed justice. 
Instruction No. 29 identified four offenses upon which the jury could rely in 
convicting defendant of obstruction of justice: 
" Conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means any conduct 
that would be punishable as a crime, including the following crimes: 
1. Aggravated Assault 
2. Burglary 
3. Homicide 
4. Abuse or Desecration of a Dead Human Body. 
R. 164.4 Each of the listed offenses is a felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 
2004) (making aggravated assault either a second or third degree felony); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004) (making aggravated assault a third degree felony or, a 
4
 As noted above, supra, at 13, defendant objected to at least some previous 
version of this instruction. His trial objection, however, went to the inclusion of 
homicide as an underlying offense. See R. 253: 248. He has not renewed that 
challenge on appeal. 
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second degree felony if committed in a dwelling); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 
2004) (making criminal homicide murder a first degree felony); Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-704 (West 2004) (making it a third degree felony for a person to "disturb[ ], 
move[ ], remove[ ], conceal[ ], or destroyf ] a dead human body"). 
Defendant argues that the jury may have found that he obstructed the 
investigation of a class B misdemeanor simple assault committed by Joseph or 
Graham. Aplt. Brf. at 20. This argument fails because the jury was not instructed on 
simple assault. Instruction No. 29 identified only aggravated assault, R. 164, and the 
jury was made aware of the elements of aggravated assault in Instruction Nos. 17 
and 18, R. 152-53. Moreover, the record clearly supports a finding of aggravated 
assault. Joseph severely beat defendant with a wrench and Graham either joined in 
the beating or aided and abetted Joseph by preventing DeGruy from coming to 
defendant's defense. See. 252: 65,68-69,173; R. 253:238-39,241,254-55. Moreover, 
defense counsel at closing argued that the assault on defendant constituted a felony 
assault. See R. 253:313. He cannot now claim on appeal that it was no more than a 
simple assault. 
Defendant argues that the jury may have found that he obstructed the 
investigation of a homicide "rang[ing] from a capital felony to a class A 
misdemeanor (negligent homicide)/7 Aplt. Brf. at 20. Again, defendant's argument 
fails because the jury was not instructed on any of the misdemeanor alternatives. 
18 
Although Instruction No. 29 identified homicide generally, R. 164, Instruction No. 
23 set forth the elements of intentional or knowing homicide, R. 158. No other 
option was offered to the jury for consideration.5 
Defendant argues that burglary could not form the basis of defendant's 
conviction because the evidence did not support such a finding where defendant 
was invited into the apartment. Aplt. Brf. at 20. Defendant, however, did not 
challenge inclusion of this offense in the jury instruction. Moreover, in closing, 
defense counsel himself suggested that Joseph's entry into the home constituted a 
burglary, but argued that the jury should not find obstruction of justice based on 
criminal conduct perpetrated against defendant as a victim. See R. 253: 310. 
Defendant cannot now claim that the jury could not rely on it because the evidence 
was insufficient. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109 (discussing invited error doctrine).6 
Defendant notes that abuse or desecration of a dead human body can either 
be a class A misdemeanor or a third degree felony. Aplt. Brf. at 20. This is true. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(4) (West 2004). However, the jury was not instructed on 
the elements of this offense, but given only its common name. As such, nothing in 
5
 In addition, Instruction Nos. 20, 21, and 22 explained the elements of 
burglary. R. 155-57. 
6
 Defendant has not claimed on appeal that a person cannot obstruct the 
investigation of a crime perpetrated against him as a victim, and for good reason. 
Nothing in the statute indicates that a victim of crime cannot commit obstruction of 
justice. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-306 (West 2004). 
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the record suggests that the jury might have based its obstruction conviction on the 
misdemeanor offense of abuse or desecration of a human body, which occurs only if 
a person fails to report the finding of a dead human body. Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-
704(a). Nothing in the common name even hints that a failure to report would 
constitute a violation of the offense. By contrast, the common name for the offense 
does suggest that moving a body and throwing it over a balcony would constitute a 
violation of the offense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-704(2)(b) & (4)(b) (making it a 
third degree felony to intentionally and unlawfully "disturb[ ], move[ ], remove[ ], 
conceal[ ], or destroy [ ] a dead human body"). The evidence clearly supported such 
a finding. 
In any event, the prosecution only asked the jury to find that defendant 
obstructed the investigation of Joseph's homicide and the aggravated assaults on 
Graham and on defendant himself. In closing and rebuttal arguments, the 
prosecution did not ask the jury to find that defendant obstructed the investigation 
of the offense of abuse or desecration of a human body. See R. 253: 298-306,316-19. 
Nor did it ask the jury to find that defendant obstructed the investigation of a 
burglary. See R. 253: 298-306, 316-19. The prosecution limited its argument to 
aggravated assault and homicide. After noting that" [t]here were lots of crimes that 
were committed in th[e] apartment/' the prosecutor in closing identified them: 
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. . . There is a crime that [Joseph] committed against [defendant], 
aggravated assault for hitting him with that socket wrench 
There was a crime of [defendant] stabbing Jerry Graham and even 
though a homicide is not charged in this case, there was a homicide in 
this case and you're allowed to consider that when you're looking at 
obstruction of justice. 
R. 253: 302. During rebuttal, the prosecutor again argued that the homicide of 
Joseph constituted predicate conduct from which the jury could find obstruction of 
justice. See R. 253: 317-19. Indeed, the homicide was the emphasis of the 
prosecution's obstruction case. 
In sum, the jury was asked to consider only a few offenses in its 
determination of whether defendant obstructed justice: homicide (a first degree 
felony), aggravated assault of Graham (a second degree felony), and aggravated 
assault of defendant (a second degree felony). While it is true that it is impossible to 
determine from the jury verdict which of these offenses the jury relied in finding 
that defendant obstructed justice, a misdemeanor offense was not among the jury's 
options. Because defendant's obstruction conviction may have been based on either 
a first degree felony (intentional or knowing homicide) or a second degree felony 
(aggravated assault), the trial court properly treated the conviction as a third degree 
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felony (the lesser of the possibilities), and enhanced it to a second degree felony 
under the "in concert" enhancement.7 
Defendant cites State v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 197 (Utah 1978), in support of his 
claim on appeal. Aplt. Brf. at 20-21. That case, however, does not support 
defendant's claim. 
In that case, Bingham and two friends approached Sonny Cordova, 
presumably to confront him about a fight he had earlier with one of Bingham's 
friends. Id. at 198. However, when Bingham saw that one of his friends was 
holding a gun, "he wanted no part of it and went back to his car." Id. While 
returning to his car, Bingham heard two shots which resulted in the death of 
Cordova (and a shoulder injury to Cordova's companion). Id. When Bingham's 
friends returned to the car, Bingham bent his rear license plate so it could not be 
read and then drove away with them. Id. Bingham was convicted of second degree 
felony obstruction of justice for aiding the escape of someone who had committed 
The State agrees that where it cannot be determined which of these offenses 
the jury relied in finding defendant guilty of obstruction of justice, the court must 
assume that it relied on the lesser of the possible offenses and sentence him 
accordingly. See United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936,940 (5th Cir.) (recognizing that 
"a sentencing judge faced with a conviction on a count that charged the violation of 
more than one statute, but where the jury failed to specify the violation found, is 
limited to imposing a sentence that does not exceed the maximum penalty under the 
statute providing the least severe punishment), cert, denied, 506 U.S 980 (1992). 
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an intentional homicide. Id. On appeal, Bingham argued that he could only be 
convicted of misdemeanor obstruction. Id.8 
Bingham argued that "before he could be convicted of [felony obstruction] it 
must first appear that the offender whose escape he aids has been convicted of 
either a capital offense or a first degree felony/' Id. He reasoned that because 
neither of his friends had been tried or convicted of homicide, his conviction should 
have been entered as a misdemeanor. Id. The Supreme Court rejected Bingham's 
argument, concluding that requiring a conviction for the underlying offense would 
"be[ ] unsound and impractical because it could defeat, rather than carry out, the 
purpose of the [obstruction] statute/' Id. The Court observed that "[t]here are a 
number of circumstances where the principal offender might not be convicted and 
the one who aided his escape could thus never be brought to justice/' Id. For 
example, "the offender might be killed" during his escape, "or he might make good 
his escape and never be apprehended, or for some other reason never prosecuted, or 
never convicted." Id. 
The Court concluded that the obstruction statute should instead be applied 
"in a reasonable and practical manner as to the guilt or innocence of the particular 
Under the statute in effect at the time, obstruction of justice was a class B 
misdemeanor unless the underlying crime was a capital felony or first degree 
felony, in which case it was a second degree felony. See Bingham, 575 P.2d at 198. 
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accused as shown by the circumstances/' Id. at 199. The Court held that "all the 
state should be required to prove is that he either knew, or should have known, that 
such a capital offense or felony in the first degree had been committed, and then 
violated the provisions of Section 76-8-306(1) by providing the offender with 
transportation for the purpose of avoiding his discovery or apprehension/7 Id. 
Bingham nevertheless argued that he could not in any event be convicted of 
felony obstruction because he did not know that either of his friends had committed 
homicide. Id. at 198. The Court agreed. Id. at 199. The Court observed that 
although Bingham aided his friends flight after hearing the shots (and bent his 
license plate so that it could not be read), no evidence established that he knew 
Cordova had actually been shot—no evidence was introduced indicating that he 
went near the cab of the truck after the shooting, that he saw his friend shoot 
Cordova, or that his friends told him what had happened. Id. The Court concluded 
that given this lack of evidence, "the facts shown [were] reasonably reconcilable 
with other possibilities" and thus "not sufficient upon which [the jury] could fairly 
and justly .. . conclude[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or 
should have known that a homicide had been committed." Id. 
To the extent defendant here suggests that the jury could not rely on the 
homicide in support of its obstruction finding because he "was not charged with 
homicide against Joseph," see Aplt. Brf. at 20, Bingham rejects that claim. As noted, 
24 
such a policy would be "unsound and impractical because it could defeat, rather 
than carry out, the purpose of the [obstruction] statute/' Bingham, 575 P.2d at 198. 
Id. Indeed, such a policy would reward someone who is not prosecuted or 
convicted because he or she was particularly successful at concealing the evidence. 
As explained in Bingham, the State must simply demonstrate that defendant 
"either knew, or should have known" that the offense had been committed. Id. 
Unlike the case in Bingham, defendant here cannot plausibly claim that he did not 
know that a homicide occurred. Moreover, Bingham's obstruction charge was 
based on obstructing the criminal investigation or apprehension of someone else. 
Defendant's obstruction charge was based on obstructing the criminal investigation 
of his own conduct. Whereas Bingham could plausibly claim that he did not know 
that the victim was mortally wounded, defendant cannot make such a claim. And 
even though some evidence may have supported a jury finding of self defense, see R. 
253: 260-62, 266 (other evidence did not, see R. 252: 84, 90, 113), such a claimed 
justification does not negate the intentional or knowing nature of Joseph's killing 
and the statute's prohibition against tampering with the evidence. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the trial court's entry of judgment of obstruction of justice as a third degree felony, 
enhanced to a second degree felony under the "in concert" enhancement. 
Respectfully submitted June 22, 2007. 
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ADDENDUM A 
INSTRUCTION NO. \Q 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits 
assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
INSTRUCTION NO. f)j 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or an 
impairment of physical condition. 
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or 
causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or 
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
"Unlawful or unlawfully" means that which is contrary to 
law or unauthorized by law, or, without legal justification, or, 
illegal. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Zp 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person is guilty of Burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a dwelling or any portion of a dwelling with the intent to 
commit a theft or commit an assault on any person. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *2.( 
When a person unlawfully enters a dwelling with the intent to commit a theft 
or an assault on any person, the crime of Burglary is committed and the successful 
completion of the intended theft or assault need not be shown. 
INSTRUCTION NO. %*& 
A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon the premises when the 
premises or any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to 
the public and when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or 
remain on the premises or such portion thereof. 
"Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging 
therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present. 
"Enter" means intrusion of any part of the body or intrusion of any physical 
object under the control of the actor. 
Instruction -2.3 
A person commits criminal homicide if that person intentionally and knowingly 
causes the death of another human being. Criminal homicide may be justified and 
not punishable as a crime if self-defense is applicable 
Instruction _ ^ j 
Conduct that constitutes a criminal offense means conduct that would be punishable as a crime 
and is separate from a violation of the offense of Obstruction of Justice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ^ 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the 
Informations. Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it 
should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged 
should not control your verdict as to any other offense charged. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Jt^> 
The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors 
in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to 
prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In criminal 
cases, the State's proof must be more powerful than that. It 
must be beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few 
things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and 
in criminal cases the law does not require proof that overcomes 
every possible doubt. If, based on your consideration of the 
evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty 
of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other 
hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not 




Before you can convict the defendant, Darren Raymond Coco, 
of the crime of Aggravated Assault, as charged in count I of the 
Information, which is alleged to have occurred on or about 
November 18, 2 005 in Salt Lake County, Utah, you must find from 
all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and 
every one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That the defendant, Darren Raymond Coco, assaulted 
Jerry Graham; and 
2. That the said defendant intentionally or knowingly 
assaulted Jerry Graham; and 
3 . That the said defendant then and there intentionally 
caused serious bodily injury to Jerry Graham. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Assault as charged 
in count I of the Information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7"$ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Darren Raymond Coco, of the crime of 
Obstructing Justice, as charged in Count II of the Information, which is alleged to 
have occurred on or about November 18, 2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every 
one of the following elements of that offense: 
1. That the defendant, Darren Raymond Coco, as a party to the offense, 
altered, destroyed, concealed, or removed any item or thing; 
2. With the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the investigation, 
apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person; 
3. Regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense. 
If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are 
convinced of the truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of Obstructing Justice as 
charged in count II of the Information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you 
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must find the defendant not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^H 
wConduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means any conduct that 
would be punishable as a crime, including the following crimes: 
1 Aggravated Assault 
2 Burglary 
3 Homicide 
4 Abuse or Desecration of a Dead Human Body. 
